Analyzing the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: Does Fiscal Policy Play a Valuable Role in Stabilisation? by V. Anton Muscatelli & Patrizio Tirelli
Abstract
This paper provides an overview of recent papers which use estimated New
Keynesian models to study the extent to which ￿scal policy can be used to
stabilize the economy. We use a variety of di⁄erent New Keynesian models,
estimated on data for both the US and for the Euro area, and highlight the
diverse transmission channels through which ￿scal policy acts in these mod-
els. Although we ￿nd that ￿scal policy can provide a useful complement to
monetary policy, especially in models where consumers have ￿nite horizons,
there are important limitations to the value added of ￿scal policy.Analyzing the Interaction of Monetary and
Fiscal Policy: Does Fiscal Policy Play a
Valuable Role in Stabilisation?1
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There is renewed interest in the role that ￿scal policy can play in macro-
economic stabilization. After a decade in which the focus has mainly been
on the delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks, atten-
tion is shifting to the potential role of ￿scal policy. We seem to be again
moving towards some of the opinions that were prevalent in the 1960s and
early 1970s, which seemed to have been swept away by the monetarist-new
classical revolution. Fiscal policy is again seen by some as an e⁄ective and
necessary tool of stabilization policy.
In the case of EMU, the role of ￿scal policy has received particular atten-
tion. Within EMU, decentralized ￿scal policy is the only policy instrument
that can respond to asymmetric shocks. This has led some observers to go
beyond the initial suggestion that within EMU automatic ￿scal stabilizers
should be the main source of counter-cyclical ￿scal action (see Buti et al.
1998, 2001), and to ask whether ￿scal policy rules could be designed to sub-
stitute for the loss of monetary policy as an instrument of domestic demand
management (see Westaway, 2003)1.
One di¢ culty in analyzing whether ￿scal policy can play a valuable role is
that ￿scal policy is a more complex policy instrument than monetary policy.
In the original Neoclassical-Keynesian Synthesis the channel of transmission
of ￿scal policy, through direct expenditures and disposable income, was well
understood. Even once additional channels of transmission were introduced
for ￿scal policy, through portfolio and wealth e⁄ects2, the analysis was qual-
itatively very similar. In contrast, the ￿ New Keynesian￿approach3, which
combines the individual dynamic optimizing framework adopted by theorists
from the ￿ new classical￿tradition (such as real business cycle theory), with
the assumption of sticky prices and/or wages, allows for a richer range of
transmission e⁄ects. Modern macroeconomic models in the tradition of the
New Keynesian approach have been developed so as to allow a number of
both demand and supply-side e⁄ects for ￿scal policy.
1For a recent survey of the issues surrounding monetary and ￿scal interactions in EMU
see Beetsma and Debrun (2004). They also cover issues surrounding the strategic interac-
tions between monetary and ￿scal authorities, which are not covered in detail here.
2See for instance Blinder and Solow (1973), and Tobin and Buiter (1976).
3The ￿ New Keynesian￿approach is also generally known by other names, such as the
New Neoclassical Synthesis (cf. Goodfriend and King, 1997), or the sticky-price DSGE
(dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) approach.
1The other di¢ culty lies in the fact that many ￿ New Keynesian￿models
are calibrated, or partially calibrated and estimated. In calibrated models4,
the impact of ￿scal and monetary policy are studied through simulations,
using parameters for the behavioral relationships that are drawn from other
empirical studies, or are based on theoretical priors. Increasingly a number
of New Keynesian models are estimated (cf. Smets and Wouters, 2002, Leith
and Malley, 2002, Muscatelli et al., 2003a,b, Del Negro et al. 2005). However,
because the coe¢ cients in the model equations are highly non-linear functions
of the behavioral (structural) parameters, some restrictions are required to
ensure identi￿cation or to ensure that the parameters are estimated with an
acceptable degree of precision.
This paper provides an overview of recent attempts to use estimated New
Keynesian models to study the extent to which ￿scal policy can be used to
stabilize the economy (see Muscatelli et al., 2003a,b, 2004b). In these pa-
pers we have used estimated New Keynesian models to study the way in
which ￿scal policy rules, which mainly take the form of automatic stabiliz-
ers, interact with a monetary policy rule which characterizes the behavior of
an independent central bank. We use a variety of di⁄erent New Keynesian
models, estimated on data for both the US and for the Euro area. These
highlight the diverse transmission channels through which ￿scal policy op-
erates. Fiscal policy￿ s role is enhanced by the presence of forward-looking
behavior by consumers, and by the presence of wealth e⁄ects on consump-
tion if Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Interestingly, there seems to be
some ￿ value added￿from ￿scal policy, despite the fact that price and wage
stickiness in these models is typically of limited duration. However, there are
potential trade-o⁄s between output and in￿ ation stabilisation.
As an extension to our earlier work, we also examine the behavior of
￿scal policies in a basic two-country version of our Euro-area model, in the
presence of a monetary union. This focuses on the case of EMU without
structural asymmetries, and highlights the extent to which an active ￿scal
policy might add value in the presence of asymmetric demand and supply
shocks.
In our analysis we do not explicitly examine some of the strategic (game-
theoretic) interdependencies between the ￿scal and monetary authorities.
These are an important ￿eld of study in the theoretical literature (see Beetsma
and Bovenberg, 1998, Dixit and Lambertini, 2001, 2003 a,b; and for a survey
4See, for instance, Westaway (2003).
2Beetsma and Debrun, 2004). By focusing on simple feedback rules we also
do not conduct the type of welfare analysis of monetary-￿scal interactions
pioneered by Benigno and Woodford (2003). We do nevertheless examine
the impact of di⁄erent policy rules on output and in￿ ation variability, and
our results can therefore be interpreted in terms of a conventional welfare
analysis framework (see Woodford, 2003).
In the next section we provide a brief survey of the nature of monetary and
￿scal policy interactions in New Keynesian models. In Section 3 we present
a broad outline of our estimated structural single-country models. We eval-
uate the extent to which ￿scal policy adds value in the single-country model
context in Section 4. In Section 5, we present some preliminary results using
a two-country version of the New Keynesian model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Fiscal Policy in New Keynesian Models: a
Brief Overview
Early versions of New Keynesian macroeconomic models involved a limited
role for ￿scal policy, by assuming that taxation is lump-sum and that repre-
sentative agents have an in￿nite planning horizon. By assuming Ricardian
equivalence, the only impact through which ￿scal policy interacts with mon-
etary policy is through a resource-withdrawal e⁄ect5. When simple feedback
rules for government expenditure are combined with an inertial monetary
policy rule, it can be shown that the impact is not unambiguously welfare-
improving in terms of reducing the volatility of output and in￿ ation (see
Muscatelli et al., 2003a). The impact of ￿scal policy is solely that of chang-
ing the pro￿le of aggregate demand.
Whether consumption actually increases in such models depends crucially
on the assumptions made about labour supply and price-stickiness, given the
linkage between consumption and leisure (and hence the real wage) via the
consumer￿ s optimization problem6. On the other hand, empirical studies of
5The usual assumption is that the government does not violate its solvency constraint
on the budget, i.e. that the ￿scal policy regime is ￿ Ricardian￿(see Woodford, 1994, Sims,
1994). Throughout this paper we shall consider policies that do not violate the solvency
constraint, and which do not run into the problems associated with the ￿ ￿scal theory of
the price level￿(see Buiter 2001, Canzoneri et al., 2001).
6For a detailed analysis of the transmission of ￿scal policy in the standard New Key-
nesian model, see Linnemann and Schabert (2003).
3the impact of ￿scal policy on the business cycle using VAR-type models do
not support this simplest version of the New Keynesian model. Studies such
as Gal￿ (1994), Blanchard and Perotti (2002). De Arcangelis and Lamartina
(2003) provide a useful survey. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mus-
catelli et al. (2004a) show that ￿scal shocks have conventional Keynesian
e⁄ects, in that an increase in government spending causes a persistent rise
in output7 and consumption. In a non-VAR context, Giavazzi et al. (2000)
investigate both country and time-speci￿c ￿scal policy events and show that
both Keynesian and neoclassical (Ricardian) e⁄ects are present. Gal￿ et al.
(2002) demonstrate that by adding non-optimising behavior to the conven-
tional New Keynesian model on the part of a proportion of consumers, who
are constrained to consume out of current income (so-called ￿ rule of thumb￿
consumers), one can, under particular parameterizations, provide an expla-
nation for the positive response of consumption to a temporary government
spending shock. In essence, if the increase in government spending generates
an increase in the real wage (providing the substitution e⁄ect between con-
sumption and leisure dominates the wealth e⁄ect), this generates an increase
in aggregate consumption because ￿ rule-of-thumb￿consumers spend out of
current income. The dynamics of this relationship can be made richer by
introducing inertia in consumer behavior through, say, habit formation.
A number of other channels can be introduced for ￿scal policy. A separate
role can be introduced for taxation, and taxes can be modelled as lump-sum
or distortionary. They can also be designed to have a di⁄erential impact on
optimizing and non-optimising consumers. By including payroll taxes one
can also model a supply-side impact for taxation.
Turning to government debt, this provides another channel of interaction
between ￿scal and monetary policy through the government budget identity.
Debt-￿nanced ￿scal de￿cits will have an impact on aggregate demand in ver-
sions of the New Keynesian model which depart from Ricardian equivalence
because of the presence of ￿nite horizons, as in the classic Blanchard-Yaari
model (see Blanchard, 1985). Alternative e⁄ects of government debt on con-
sumer behavior can also be considered, such as the impact that ￿nancial
wealth (money and bonds) has on household transactions costs, which also
can explain a departure from Ricardian equivalence (see Linnemann and Sch-
abert, 2002, Schabert, 2004). Clearly one could also introduce more complex
supply-side e⁄ects for ￿scal policy by allowing public expenditures (invest-
7The implied ￿scal multiplier is close to or greater than unity.
4ment) to have a role in private production and for tax distortions to impact
on private investment decisions.
As noted earlier, there is a trade-o⁄ in estimating New Keynesian mod-
els with respect to the richness and complexity of the model which can be
considered and the number of structural parameters which can be estimated
freely. In what follows we examine the interaction of ￿scal and monetary pol-
icy rules in the context of estimated New Keynesian models for the USA and
Euroland, which contain a number of the features discussed above: habit
persistence in consumption; non-optimising (rule-of-thumb) consumers; ￿-
nite horizons in consumers￿optimizing decisions; sticky prices; government
expenditures; taxation e⁄ects on both consumption and on ￿rms￿marginal
costs (through payroll taxes). In the case of each model, the question we ad-
dress is whether ￿scal policy, through feedback rules on output adds value to
the stabilization role played by monetary policy, which is assumed to follow
a standard (inertial) forward-looking in￿ ation targeting rule.
3 Structure of the Models
3.1 General Structure
We consider two basic versions of the New Keynesian model for estimation
and policy simulation. The models are set out in detail in the Appendix.
The basic model follows Gal￿ et al. (2002) in assuming that some consumers
(a proportion #) are non-optimising (rule-of-thumb), and simply consume
out of current disposable income. We modify the Gal￿ et al. (2002) model
by allowing for habit formation on the part of optimizing consumers (the
remaining proportion 1 ￿ #), who optimize over an in￿nite horizon with a
discount factor ￿. Despite the presence of non-optimising consumers, Ricar-
dian equivalence holds in the model as there is no link between government
liabilities and aggregate demand.
The production sector of the model follows the standard New Keynesian
assumption of monopolistic competition in the production of the consump-
tion good, which ￿rms produce using a Cobb-Douglas technology with labour
and a ￿xed capital stock. Total consumption is given by an aggregate of the
imperfectly substitutable goods, where the consumption aggregator is given
by a CES function. This coupled with the assumption of sticky prices in
the form of Calvo￿ s (1983) assumption of staggered price setting, combined
5with a degree of partial indexation which introduces an element of in￿ ation
persistence (see Gal￿ et al., 2001)8. Following the Calvo pricing mechanism,
(1 ￿ ￿) is the proportion of ￿rms adjusting their prices every period, and
the remainder supply output on demand, at a constant price. Of those who
adjust prices, a share ￿ of these is assumed to index prices to in￿ ation in
the previous period, whereas the rest, (1 ￿ ￿), set their prices optimally to
maximize expected discounted real pro￿ts, with a discount factor ￿. We do
not model wage rigidity explicitly9, but simply assume in our simulations
that nominal wages adjust to past in￿ ation over two quarters.
In this basic model (which we label version I), ￿scal policy impacts on
the economy through the New Keynesian ￿ IS-curve￿ by directly a⁄ecting
the consumption of rule-of-thumb (ROT) consumers, and the consumption-
smoothing behavior of optimizing consumers. Government spending is non-
productive and adds to aggregate demand. It is ￿nanced through personal
taxation, which is paid by consumers (of both types), and through a payroll
tax on ￿rms￿employees. The payroll tax ensures that taxation impacts on
pricing behavior by ￿rms by introducing a tax wedge in the New Keynesian
￿ Phillips Curve￿ .
We then consider a modi￿ed version of this model (which we label version
II), which introduces the debt-channel as an additional channel of transmis-
sion for ￿scal policy. Whilst retaining the assumption that some consumers
follow a ROT behavior, here we introduce the assumption that optimizing
consumers have Blanchard (1985)-type ￿nite horizons with a constant prob-
ability of death as in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2004). This removes Ricardian
equivalence, and allows debt-￿nanced ￿scal policy to impact, through wealth
e⁄ects, on the consumption of optimizing consumers. The introduction of
a wealth e⁄ect also introduces a channel of interaction between monetary
and ￿scal policy, as interest-rate changes will impact on aggregate demand
through the government budget constraint.
3.2 Measuring the Performance of Policy Rules
We simulate our estimated models by combining feedback ￿scal rules based
on the usual structure of automatic ￿scal stabilizers with a forward-looking
8This was pioneered by Gal￿ and Gertler (1999). Similar backward-looking elements
can be introduced to the NKPC equation by introducing indexation of all non-re-optimised
prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 2001, and Woodford, 2003).
9For an example of an estimated model of wage rigidity, see Leith and Malley (2002).
6in￿ ation targeting monetary (interest rate) rule, which is estimated/calibrated
on the data, and which allows us to examine the e¢ ciency of di⁄erent ￿scal
rules when combined with a monetary rule. Both the ￿scal and monetary
policy rules are allowed to display a certain amount of inertia, in that as well
as depending on the output gap (and expected in￿ ation in the case of the
monetary rule), they contain an autoregressive element.
In analyzing the interactions between ￿scal and monetary policy rules we
do not conduct a formal welfare analysis as in Benigno and Woodford (2003),
or an analysis of the optimal degree of in￿ ation, government debt and tax
rates volatility as in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2001). Nevertheless, our re-
sults provide a useful benchmark in understanding how ￿scal policy rules, as
characterized by automatic stabilizers, interact with monetary policy rules in
the current institutional arrangements where the ￿scal and monetary policy
authorities act independently of each other. We present our results both as
dynamic simulation runs and as variance frontiers illustrating the trade-o⁄
between output and in￿ ation volatility of di⁄erent degrees of responsiveness
of interest rates to expected in￿ ation. The results can therefore be inter-
preted without having to adopt a particular welfare criterion.
One possible criticismof our approach is that, by focusing on estimated/calibrated
monetary policy rules, we do not examine how the monetary authorities
might respond to di⁄erent forms of ￿scal intervention. In practice one might
expect an independent central bank to change its optimal response to change
in response to changes in the ￿scal rule. We might therefore be underestimat-
ing the welfare-enhancing e⁄ect of some ￿scal rules. There are three possible
responses to this observation. First, estimated monetary policy rules typi-
cally involve a greater degree of inertia than optimal monetary rules derived
from a dynamic optimization exercise10, and hence looking at fully optimal
rules may not be a good description of how monetary policy works in prac-
tice. Second, the information requirements for the monetary authorities to
respond to perceived changes in ￿scal rule are likely to be quite demanding.
This issue, together with the related one of strategic interactions between
￿scal and monetary authorities will be explored in future work11. Third, the
10In Muscatelli et al. (2003a) we compare the performance of an optimal monetary
policy rule with an estimated/calibrated rule. There are various possible explanations for
the estimated inertia in reaction functions. Objectives such as ￿nancial stability are not
captured by simple New Keynesian models. Inertial rules may also be robust in some
instances (see Giannoni and Woodford 2002a,b).
11This is an issue which pre-dates New Keynesian models (see McKibbin and Sachs,
7aim of this work is not to conduct some historical counterfactual analysis to
see if monetary or ￿scal policy ￿ could have done better￿during some partic-
ular historical period. Rather, it looks at whether how di⁄erent ￿scal policy
rules perform in the presence of the type of monetary policy behavior that
has characterized the recent era of in￿ ation targeting.
Our work complements that of previous authors. Gordon and Leeper
(2003) ￿nd, using a calibrated model for the US economy, that ￿scal sta-
bilization policies tends to destabilize the business cycle because of their
impact on debt service obligations. Jones (2002) uses an estimated stochas-
tic growth model (without price stickiness) for the US to show that ￿scal
policy had limited stabilization e⁄ects in the post-war period. AndrØs and
DomØnech (2003) also examine the design of ￿scal rules and their impact
on macroeconomic stability, but focus mainly on the comparison of distor-
tionary and lump-sum taxes on output volatility. Their model does not allow
for non-optimising behavior or ￿nite horizons on the part of consumers, but
allows for a richer speci￿cation of distortionary taxation. They ￿nd that dis-
tortionary taxes may worsen the in￿ ation-output volatility trade-o⁄ unless
there are substantial real and nominal rigidities. Hence automatic stabiliz-
ers may not be welfare-enhancing because of their impact on the aggregate




In what follows, ￿ hatted￿lower-case variables represent percentage deviations
from the steady state, and ￿ barred￿variables denote steady-state values. The
forward-looking monetary policy rule for the nominal interest rate b it follows a
form similar to the standard forward-looking Taylor rule speci￿cation which
has become commonplace in the literature12 (see Clarida et al., 1998, 2000;
Muscatelli et al. 2002; Giannoni and Woodford, 2002a,b),
1988).
12The main di⁄erence is that we use a contemporaneous value of the output gap (see
Muscatelli et al. 2002) as opposed to expected future values, as in Clarida, Gali and
Gertler (1998, 2000). For a detailed discussion of these issues, see Giannoni and Woodford
(2002a,b). For an alternative approach to modeling interest rate responses, involving
nonlinearities in reaction functions, see Cukierman and Muscatelli (2001).
8b it = ￿1b ￿t+q + ￿2b yt+s + ￿3b it￿1 (1)
where the rule also allows for interest-rate smoothing (inertia) if ￿3 6= 0,
and where b yt+s is the output gap (expected at time t+s), and b ￿t+q is expected
in￿ ation (at time t+q).
3.3.2 Fiscal authority
We consider a simple backward-looking format for the government￿ s ￿scal pol-
icy rules (automatic stabilizers), following inter alia Van den Noord (2000),
Westaway (2003) and AndrØs and DomØnech (2003). This captures the more
realistic lagged response of ￿scal policy to macroeconomic variables due to
automatic stabilizers:
b gt = ￿1b gt￿1 ￿ ￿2b yt￿1 ￿ ￿3b bt (2)
b ￿t = ’1b ￿t￿1 + ’2b yt￿1 + ’3b bt (3)
where b gt is government spending, b ￿t is the vector of our two tax measures,
personal taxes b tt and payroll taxes, b t￿
t. Our taxation rule therefore imposes
the same adjustment pattern on both taxes, and does not look at how a mix
of tax measures might improve the design of policy13. In the case of our
single-country models we adopt ￿scal policy rules that only feed back on the
output gap and the lagged policy variable. Our chosen policy parameters
and estimated structural parameters are such that when the single-country
models are simulated the ￿scal policy regime is Ricardian and there are no
problems with determinacy.
For our baseline case, we set ￿1 = ’1 = 0:6; ￿2 = ’2 = 0:5; ￿3 = ’3 = 0:05.
A coe¢ cient of 0.5 on output is consistent with the empirical evidence in
Van den Noord (2000) and adopted in studies on ￿scal stabilization (e.g.
Westaway, 2003), and are broadly consistent with the correlations for US
￿scal data over the cycle (cf. Gordon and Leeper, 2003). We allow for an
element of inertia as empirical estimates of ￿scal policy rules on quarterly
data suggest an important role for an autoregressive term. The term on debt,
13The importance of the taxation policy mix is considered in Muscatelli et al. (2003b,
2005). There we also consider a number of variants for the ￿scal rules, and we also
conduct some sensitivity analysis, to see to what extent the performance of these ￿scal
rules is a⁄ected by small changes in the estimated model parameters.
9which follows Bohn (1998), has a coe¢ cient of 0.05. This feedback on debt
is su¢ cient to ensure that there is determinacy.
The government is assumed to ￿nance its de￿cits using indexed bonds.
The debt dynamics are given by a log-linearised version of the standard
government budget constraint (where b rt is the real interest rate, and d gTR
t are
government transfers which are kept constant during our simulations):























Our models are simulated under forward-looking (model-consistent) ex-
pectations, where consumers take into account the policy rules and the gov-
ernment budget constraint.
3.4 Econometric Estimation and Calibration
In our empirical work (see Muscatelli et al. 2003b, 2004b) we estimate the
IS and Phillips curves for version I of the model using US quarterly data,
over the sample period 1970(1)-2001(2). For the Euro area, we estimate the
IS curve and use the estimates for the Phillips curve reported in Gal￿ et al.
(2001)14. The Euro area study uses the arti￿cial Euro data from Fagan et al.
(2001), over the sample 1970(1)-1998(2). The equations are estimated using
the generalized methods of moments (GMM) framework. The steady-state
values in the equations are taken from the sample means15. As noted above,
the highly nonlinear nature of the estimation equations and the need for
su¢ cient restrictions to ensure identi￿cation imply that some of the model
parameters have to be imposed. In particular, in the case of the USA in
estimating the Phillips Curve we have to impose that the price elasticity of
the di⁄erentiated goods, ￿ is equal to 4, implying a price-mark-up16 of 30%,
14For another approach to the estimation of DSGE models, see Del Negro and Schorfeide
(2004) and Del Negro et al. (2005). Van Aarle et al. (2003) examine the transmission of
monetary and ￿scal policy in EMU and two-country models.
15The detailed issues surrounding the estimations are not reported here for reasons of
space. The interested reader should consult Muscatelli et al. (2003a,b, 2004b) for more
details, including the steady-state values used.
16This follows Erceg et al. (2000). It is a lower value of the elasticity of substitution
than that used by Gal￿ et al. (2001) and Leith and Malley (2002), where ￿ > 10 but in
practice the estimates of the other parameters did not seem to be very sensitive to changes
10that the labour elasticity of output, 1￿￿ is equal to 0:6 and that in Version
I of the model, the habit formation parameter on aggregate consumption
(￿) is unity17, which implies that the stock of habits are equal to aggregate
lagged consumer expenditure. In the case of the Euro area the estimates of
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in the consumption function (￿) were
imprecise and we imposed a value of 4, following a grid search18. Similarly,
in the case of the USA, we could not get precise estimates without imposing
a value for the discount factor in the consumers￿optimization problem (￿),
which following a grid search so as to minimize the criterion function was
￿xed at 0.99. Thus, in the case of Version I of the model, our structural
model is essentially estimated, subject to the restrictions on the steady-state
values and on the above parameters. Table 1 reports the estimated values
of the key structural parameters in our models (see Muscatelli et al., 2003b,
2004b).
In the case of version II, we use a calibrated model, retaining the pa-
rameter values estimated in Version I of the model, augmenting them with
a calibrated value for the probability of death19 ($). Here we assume that
(1 ￿ $) = 0:9943 which implies an average life-span for the consumer of 30
years, as our models are based on quarterly data.
in the value of ￿: However, a higher mark-up does seem to be more sensible given that
marginal costs exclude capital costs in this framework. In addition, a higher value of ￿
would imply an implausibly small direct e⁄ect of output on prices through the marginal
cost term. For the Euro area estimates, Gal￿ et al. (2001) use a labour income share of
0.75.
17In our earlier study, Muscatelli et al. (2003a), where we estimate ￿ freely in a simpler
version of the IS curve we found that it was insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from unity.
18In current work we are exploring alternative estimation methodologies (see Del Negro
and Schorfheide, 2004).
19In practice we would not expect the addition of an additional term to the IS equation
with an imposed parameter to make a considerable di⁄erence to the estimated structural
parameters.
11Table 1: Structural Parameter Estimates- USA and Euro-Area
Parameter USA Estimates Euro-area Estimates20
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Turning to the monetary policy rule, for the USA Muscatelli et al. (2003b)
estimate the following values of the policy rule parameters: ￿1 = 0:209;
￿2 = 0:148;￿3 = 0:885; with all parameters highly signi￿cant at the 5%
level. The long-run e⁄ect of expected in￿ ation on nominal interest rates
20For ￿;￿;￿ we are simply reporting the estimated values in Gal￿ et al. (2001) as
corrected in Gal￿ et al. (2003).
12that is given by ￿4 = (￿1=(1 ￿ ￿3)), and is signi￿cantly greater than unity
(￿4 = 1:817 with an asymptotic standard error equal to 0.095 ). For the case
of the Euro-area, we use the estimated interest rate rule parameters reported
in Sauer and Sturm (2003).
4 Simulation Results
We now use these estimated and calibrated models to illustrate the extent
to which ￿scal policy might provide a useful role in stabilization policy. We
begin by looking at some of the properties of the di⁄erent versions of the
New Keynesian model in relation to the transmission of ￿scal policy, and
then examine the extent to which the richer version of the model provides us
with useful insights for current policy questions.
In the case of Euroland, clearly the assumption of a single ￿scal author-
ity is false, and the characterization would be one where similar symmetric
shocks are hitting all countries in the Euro area, and the ￿scal rules assumed
here represent an aggregate response. In Section 5 we will consider the more
realistic case of a two-country model where each country has its own ￿scal
authority so that we can consider asymmetric shocks.
4.1 The transmission of ￿scal policy under di⁄erent
models
Figures 1-4 show, for the case of the Version I model, estimated on US data,
the response pro￿les of output and in￿ ation following a temporary shock to
the IS curve (Figures 1-2) and to the Phillips curve (Figures 3-4)21. For
each shock we examine the behavior of the model when the monetary policy
rule alone (1) is active, and when both monetary policy and the ￿scal policy
rules (2) and (3) are active. When monetary policy is acting alone, we set
￿1 = ’1 = ￿2 = ’2 = 0, but still allow ￿scal policy to stabilize the debt
dynamics which result from the monetary policy response, and maintain
long-run ￿scal balance.
21The shocks to the IS and Phillips Curves are temporary, imparting a shock of 1% in
the ￿rst period to output and in￿ ation respectively, and decaying with an autoregressive
parameter of 0.5. The IS curve could be interpreted as a temporary consumption shock,
whilst the Phillips curve shock could be interpreted as a temporary shock to marginal
costs.
13Figures 1-4 show that in Version I ￿scal policy does reduce the volatil-
ity of output and in￿ ation in response to demand shocks, and the volatility
of output due to a supply shock. Government spending stabilizes output
directly, via the resource-withdrawal e⁄ect in the IS curve which impacts
on optimizing consumers. Taxation functions through two channels. Per-
sonal taxes reduce the disposable income of ROT consumers, and thereby
impact on optimizing consumers. Payroll taxes reduce aggregate supply by
increasing the cost of production of ￿rms. However, payroll taxes also tend
to increase prices (cf. Buti et al., 2003).
What role do ROT consumers play in the transmission of ￿scal policy?
In order to see this, we plot Figures 5-8, which repeat the shocks in Fig-
ures 4, but where we have modi￿ed the baseline parameters of the Version
I model to include a higher proportion of ROT consumers. To be precise,
these ￿gures show the impact of raising the proportion of employment made
up by ROT consumers22 (NRT=N) to 0.7, and consequently lowering the
proportion of consumption determined by optimizing consumers (Co=C) to
0.571. Having more ROT consumers makes the economy more volatile to
demand and supply shocks. It is important to note that there are two ef-
fects at play here. First, increasing the number of ROT consumers makes
payroll taxes more e⁄ective. Second, it reduces the degree of consumption
smoothing, and reduces the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy by reducing the
size of the coe¢ cient on the interest rate in the IS curve. This second e⁄ect
is found to dominate23. Fiscal policy does add assist monetary policy, whose
potency has diminished, as payroll taxes impact directly on ROT consumers￿
disposable income and expenditure.
However, as might be expected in version I of the model, where ￿scal
policy plays a limited role, the impact on volatility is not large. This supports
the ￿ndings of AndrØs and DomØnech (2003). Our models do not allow for
major tax distortions and hence they have more limited supply e⁄ects. It is
apparent why, quantitatively, if taxation were to have distortionary e⁄ects
on supply, it might outweigh the bene￿ts of aggregate demand stabilization.
Next, let us consider what the impact is of allowing Blanchard-type ￿nite
22The value of 0.7 corresponds to the upper end of the 95% con￿dence band given the
estimated parameter shown in Table 1.
23This can be veri￿ed by plotting variance frontiers for di⁄erent proportions of ROT.
See the results reported in Muscatelli et al. (2003b). The intuition behind this result is
apparent from the Appendix, as ROT consumers do not smooth income a high proportion
of ROT consumers reduces the impact of interest rates in consumption.
14horizons in consumer behavior, as in version II of the model. Table 2 shows,
for the case of the USA, the variance of output and in￿ ation when we simulate
Version II of the model following a demand and supply shock, in the case
where the optimizing consumers have ￿nite horizons, and the special case24
where the consumers have in￿nite horizons as the probability of death goes
to zero. The demand (IS) and supply (NKPC) shocks are identical to the
experiments performed with Version I.
Table 2: Finite Horizons and Fiscal Policy - the USA case
Blanchard Consumers In￿nite Horizons
Demand Shock Output Var In￿ ation Var Output Var In￿ ation Var
M 1.05 0.05 1.35 0.12
M+￿scal 0.54 0.04 1.23 0.11
Supply Shock
M 1.39 0.25 1.43 0.27
M+￿scal 1.22 0.26 1.38 0.26
Note that the impact of introducing ￿nite horizons is that ￿scal policy
becomes more powerful, as the variance of output is reduced considerably by
adding ￿scal policy (M+￿scal) to monetary policy alone (M). In all cases,
the impact on the variability of in￿ ation is small. The reduction in output
volatility works through two channels: in terms of the ￿rst-period response
of output to shocks it is less than with in￿nite horizons, as the feedback
response of ￿scal policy to output and the impact of ￿scal and monetary pol-
icy on debt dynamics is factored into consumers￿expectations. However, the
cyclical impact of the monetary-￿scal interactions is more marked, and pro-
vokes a cyclical rather than a monotonic adjustment, potentially increasing
the variability of output and in￿ ation. The cyclicality is due to the dynamic
interaction between Blanchard-type consumers￿response to the debt dynam-
ics in the model, and the ROT consumers who introduce inertia in consumer
spending. Therefore potentially there is a trade-o⁄ from ￿nite horizons, and
this result may be dependent on the model￿ s parameters. It would therefore
be interesting to do some sensitivity analysis, by comparing the performance
of ￿scal policy in the USA with that in our model estimated and calibrated on
Eurozone data, and to check to what extent the results are dependent on the
24This special case of Version II is essentially Version I without habit formation in
consumption.
15strength of ￿scal policy￿ s cyclical response and monetary policy￿ s response
to in￿ ation. We now examine this issue.
4.2 Does Fiscal Policy Help to Stabilize Output and
In￿ ation? The USA versus Europe
In order to address this question, we extend the results of Table 2 by com-
paring the cases of the USA and Europe. To limit the number of cases
considered, we focus solely on supply shocks. We also consider the impact
of varying the responses of ￿scal and monetary policy. Again, Table 3 shows
the variances of output and in￿ ation when the model is simulated with only
monetary policy active (M), and monetary plus ￿scal policy (M+￿scal). In
addition, however, we also show what happens if ￿scal policy responds more
powerfully over the cycle (￿2 = ’2 = 0:9), designated by M+￿scal2, than in
the baseline case; and we show what happens if monetary policy responds
more powerfully to in￿ ation (￿4 = 2:4), designated as M2+￿scal, than in the
baseline case.
Table 3: Adding Value from Fiscal Policy - the USA vs Europe
Blanchard Consumers In￿nite Horizons
Eurozone Output Var In￿ ation Var Output Var In￿ ation Var
M 1.21 0.30 1.25 0.31
M+￿scal 1.06 0.32 1.18 0.30
M+￿scal2 1.02 0.33 1.16 0.31
M2+￿scal 1.15 0.29 1.22 0.29
USA
M 1.39 0.25 1.43 0.27
M+￿scal 1.22 0.26 1.38 0.26
M+￿scal2 1.17 0.27 1.35 0.28
M2+￿scal 1.35 0.23 1.44 0.24
Note from Table 3 that, in the case of Europe (a) ￿scal policy reduces
output variability more than in the USA; and (b) the existence of Blanchard-
type ￿nite horizons enhances ￿scal policy more than in the USA. In compar-
ison, however, Europe exhibits a larger trade-o⁄ in terms of higher in￿ ation
variability. Note, however, that the impact on in￿ ation volatility is much
smaller than that of output volatility, so that ￿scal policy is likely to be
16welfare-enhancing unless a much greater weight is placed on in￿ ation stabil-
ity25.
The explanation for the greater impact of ￿scal policy in Europe prob-
ably lies in three factors: the higher steady-state share of taxation, which
strengthens the force of ￿scal policy; the slightly higher average steady-state
level of debt which increases the impact of wealth e⁄ects on consumption; and
the higher share of ROT consumers as evidenced by the estimated structural
parameters reported in Table 1.
It does suggest a greater advantage to using ￿scal policy in Europe. How-
ever, we should recall that we are considering the arti￿cial case of a coordi-
nated ￿scal policy across the Eurozone. A more pertinent question is whether
in the actual case of a centralized European Central Bank monetary policy
and a decentralized (and uncoordinated) ￿scal policy across di⁄erent Euro-
zone countries this apparent advantage to using ￿scal policy countercyclically
still holds. We now address this point using a two-country version of our
model.
5 Fiscal Policy and EMU: a Two-Country Ver-
sion of the Euro Model
Given the positive results obtained for the use of ￿scal policy in the Version II
model calibrated on Eurozone data, the natural question is whether one could
￿nd a role for ￿scal policy in a two-country version of the model where shocks
and ￿scal responses are not perfectly symmetric, and where ￿scal policy
is delegated to national authorities but there is a single ECB. Analyzing
monetary-￿scal policy interactions in two-country model would require a full
paper in itself, and here we can only begin to highlight some of the issues
that one might address. In a follow-up paper (Muscatelli et al., 2005) we
explore the issue more fully, using a richer open economy model26.
In order to make our results comparable with those in the previous sec-
tions, we take the simplest possible case: we assume that the two countries
25Which is possible if the welfare criterion is mainly concerned with price distortions
(see Woodford, 2003).
26Gal￿ and Monacelli (2004) consider optimal ￿scal policy in a small open economy,
rather than the two-country open-economy version considered here. Government spending
in their model enters the utility function of consumers.
17are entirely symmetric in terms of structure, so that each has the same struc-
tural parameters as those estimated on Euro-wide data. The detailed model
is outlined in the Appendix.
The model can be parameterized using the same structural parameter and
steady state values as the single Euro-area model. The only caveat is that
the assumed price elasticity of demand ￿ is quite large, as it is set at 4, and
this implies a rather large relative demand e⁄ect within EMU. However, for
most of the shocks considered here the movement in relative prices between
countries is quite small, so the relative demand e⁄ect will not dominate the
results.
The other point to note is that equilibrium in asset markets implies that
the sum of domestic and foreign bonds held by consumers in both country
equals the joint supply of bonds provided by each ￿scal authority. In sim-
ulating the model one could focus on equilibria where, given the absence of
default risk and exchange risk, the debt of each ￿scal authority grows or
declines over time. However, recall that the ￿scal rules for each country not
only a includes a feedback term on the output gap and an autoregressive
parameter, but also has a feedback on deviations of debt from steady state
(with feedback parameters ￿3 = ’3 = 0:05). This means that following the
shock the model returns to a more realistic steady state, which embodies
the type of constraint envisaged in the Maastricht criteria and the Stability
and Growth Pact. Each country will seek to restore its initial level of debt.
Given that our model is in deviations from equilibrium, this is equivalent to
the ￿scal authorities targeting a given level of the debt-income ratio.
5.1 Fiscal and Monetary Interactions in a Two-Country
Model
In considering asymmetric shocks, we focus on demand and supply shocks
on one of the two EMU countries. The reason for not considering pure
asymmetric shocks (shocks of equal and opposite sign on each EMU country)
is that, given the identical structure of the two countries, and that the ECB
is assumed to target EMU average outcomes, monetary policy will not react
to such shocks, and there will not be any ￿scal-monetary policy interactions.
Instead we focus on temporary shocks to the IS curve and Phillips curve of
one of the two EMU countries, using the same format for the demand and
supply shocks as we have used before.
18Again we tabulate our results for the variance of output and in￿ ation
in each country when the ￿scal rules are active and are absent in Table 4.
Table 4 shows the case where only ECB policy is active (M) and the case
where ECB policy and both countries ￿scal policies are active (M+￿scal).
In order to clarify the discussion, we normalize the variances of output and
in￿ ation relative to the case where monetary policy is operating alone (i.e.
we normalize the ￿rst row of variances of each shock to unity). This shows
the net impact of adding ￿scal policy to a central monetary policy. In our
discussion we shall focus mainly on output, as the impact of ￿scal policies
through demand on in￿ ation are quite small given the coe¢ cients on outputs
and payroll taxes in the estimated Phillips curve, and any bene￿ts from
￿scal policy will accrue largely through output stabilization. This was also
apparent from the earlier single-country simulations following a supply shock.
Table 4: Fiscal Con￿ ict in Europe
Country 1 Country 2
Demand Shock Output Var In￿ ation Var Output Var In￿ ation Var
M 1 1 1 1
M+￿scal 0.83 0.99 1.01 1.01
Supply Shock
M 1 1 1 1
M+￿scal 0.90 0.99 1.05 1.01
Turning ￿rst to the demand shock, we see that there is a reduction in
output volatility, albeit a small one, in country 1. In the case of country 2
the initial impact of the ￿scal policy is to cause a greater deviation in output
from equilibrium, although the speed of convergence is slightly improved.
The overall impact is to increase the variance of output slightly as can be
seen from Table 4, with most of the variation coming in the ￿rst 2-3 quarters.
The reasons why in a two-country setting the value added from ￿scal policy is
less than might be expected is that we are not considering a pure asymmetric
shock, when the two countries￿￿scal policies would be acting in concert and
monetary policy remains inactive27. In the single country shock considered
here, the monetary authority reacts to the demand shock by raising interest
27This is related to a point made by Uhlig (2002) who notes that in EMU the negative
externalities of di⁄erent ￿scal authorities reacting to a symmetric shock runs through the
central bank￿ s reaction function. In our case it occurs even though the shock only occurs
in a single country.
19rates, thus causing output to fall in country 2. Thus, the two ￿scal policies
will be acting against each other in the short run. In addition, the presence of
a feedback term on debt implies that the increase in interest rates will increase
debt ￿nance and will partially constrain ￿scal policy in both countries. As
noted by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2004), varying the feedback term on debt
in the ￿scal rule can have a signi￿cant impact on the output dynamics in a
model with Blanchard-type consumers.
Turning to the supply shock, again we observe a reduction in variability
in output in country 1, but in country 2 output variability increases, as the
cost of adjustment is pushed from country 1 to country 2. Given that the
￿scal rules in the two countries are symmetric and operate with some inertia,
country 2 su⁄ers again from the fact that the ECB reacts to future expected
in￿ ation increases, and forward-looking consumers take this into account.
This externality from ￿scal policy is partly a result of the formulation of
the ￿scal rules, and in Muscatelli et al. (2005) we investigate the robust-
ness of this con￿ ict in greater detail. In general we ￿nd that some aspects
of the ￿scal con￿ ict are robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations, including a more
contemporaneous correlation between automatic stabilizers and output.
6 Conclusions
In this review we have provided a preliminary assessment of the extent to
which ￿scal policy provides a valuable tool for stabilization alongside mone-
tary policy in the context of New Keynesian models.
What have we learned? There are three main themes that emerge. The
￿rst is that, once one allows for substantial deviations from the assump-
tion that consumers are fully optimizing and have in￿nite horizons, there is
considerable scope for ￿scal policy to reduce output volatility, although in
some contexts this might be at no improvement in terms of reducing in￿ ation
volatility, or may result in trading o⁄ lower output volatility against higher
in￿ ation volatility.
The second theme is that estimated New Keynesian models still involve
limited channels for ￿scal-monetary policy interactions. Our model allow
for a richer range than some recent New Keynesian models, but in other
respects are still limited: for instance in the range of taxation distortions on
the supply side, which may be signi￿cant in reducing the e¢ ciency of ￿scal
policy. Allowing an impact of public expenditure on private consumption
20and investment may change the results in either direction. The e¢ ciency
of ￿scal policy will also be reduced by the extent to which the ￿scal policy
instruments are subject to stochastic deviations which are proportional to
the strength of the ￿scal stabilizers. Finally, as with most estimated New
Keynesian models, our models are limited in the range of parameters that
can be freely estimated. The development of new estimation techniques in
this area may improve the robustness of our estimates.
The third main theme is that in two-country models it becomes apparent
that automatic stabilizers may, in certain circumstances, o⁄set each other in
ways that may limit the e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal policy. In general the focus
has been on the ability of ￿scal stabilizers to cope with the case of a pure
asymmetric shock, where externalities still exist, but where providing ￿scal
policy reactions are su¢ ciently aggressive, output can be stabilized. What
we focus on here is the interactions between ￿scal and monetary policy where
there is an asymmetric shock which impacts di⁄erentially on the two countries
and therefore triggers as response from the ECB. We demonstrate that this
might hamper the e¢ cacy of ￿scal policy. In these cases, the precise design
of the feedback rules and the automatic stabilizers becomes important and
this should be the subject of further research (see Muscatelli et al., 2005).
In particular, looking at optimally designed simple rules should improve the
performance of ￿scal policy against the benchmarks analyzed here.
To sum up, New Keynesian models have evolved to the point where a
role can be found for ￿scal policy, and empirically estimated models suggest
that such policies could be welfare enhancing. But there is no unambigu-
ous endorsement of some of the more optimistic Keynesian pronouncements
of the 1960s and early 1970s, which saw ￿scal policy as a necessary tool
of stabilization policy even for relatively small deviations from the full em-
ployment/natural rate equilibrium. In this sense there is no return to the
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Figure 8: In￿ation Response to Supply Shock - High ROT
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289 Appendix: The Models
9.1 One-Country model
9.1.1 Version I
Consumers As noted above, in this version of the model we follow Gal￿
et al. (2002) by assuming two types of consumers, although we also assume
that the optimizing consumers￿utility is a⁄ected by habit. A proportion #
of consumers follow a rule of thumb, and consume out of current disposable
income. This admittedly ad hoc assumption may be justi￿ed by assuming
myopia or limited participation to capital markets. We also assume that rule-
of-thumb consumers supply a ￿xed amount of labour. Thus the consumption














where Pt is the consumption price level, ￿ NRT de￿nes a constant amount




t de￿nes net taxes
(transfers, G
TRj
t ; minus taxes, T
j
t ) lump-sum by assumption.
Consumers in the second group, i, bene￿t from full access to capital
markets and are therefore free to optimize. The proportion of optimizing
consumers in the economy is given as (1 ￿ #): Each optimizing consumer is
























t represents consumption of a basket of goods (to be de￿ned
below), Ht is an index of external habits, ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion, No
t is the level of employment, and "l is a shock to labour
supply. As in Smets and Wouters (2002), money does not appear in the
28Gal￿ et al. (2003) show that supplying a constant amount of labour is optimal when
consumption and leisure are non-separable in the utility function and net taxes, levied
on rule-of-thumb consumers are always nil. This result would never obtain in our model,
where taxes and transfers are explicitly modeled. For sake of simplicity we assume a
constant labour supply. Since consumption cannot be negative, this implies that we impose





for any given level of the real wage.
29utility function(6), nor is part of ￿nancial wealth29.We assume that habits










Optimizing consumers maximize (6) subject to their intertemporal budget
























where consumers hold their ￿nancial wealth in the form of in￿ ation-
indexed bonds, B, which yield a real return of rt. The optimizing consumer￿ s
disposable income consists of real labour income Wt
Pt Noi
t plus the real div-
idends from the pro￿ts of the imperfectly competitive ￿rms, Di
t, plus real
public transfers GTRi
t minus real personal taxes T i
t.
Firms Firms￿production technology is assumed to be a simple Cobb-
Douglas function of labour and capital for each consumption good variety z.
Capital is assumed ￿xed and normalized to unity:
Yt(z) = A(Nt(z))
1￿￿ (9)
We introduce ￿scal distortions by assuming that taxes on labour take








where t￿ is the tax rate per unit of employed labour, i.e. t￿ = T￿
N , where
T ￿are the total revenues from the payroll tax.
Turning next to the model of ￿rms￿pricing behavior, we consider a stan-
dard model of monopolistic competition with sticky prices, as set out in Gal￿
et al. (2001), and Leith and Malley (2002)31. Total consumption is given by a
29As in Woodford (2003), the economy is assumed to be ￿ cashless￿in the limit at the
steady-state equilibrium.
30This implies that the optimizing consumer￿ s choice between leisure and consumption
is not a⁄ected.
31See also Erceg et al. (2000), and Sbordone (2002).
































where Pt(z) is the price of good z, and Pt is the consumption price index













Sticky prices in the model are modeled as described in the main text.
9.1.2 Version II
Consumers In this second version of the model all individuals do not ex-
pect to live forever and face a constant probability of death in each period,
$. However, as before there are two types of consumers. A proportion # of
consumers follow a rule of thumb, as in (5).
The optimizing consumers, making up a proportion (1 ￿ #), now behave
di⁄erently because of the presence of a ￿nite horizon. Each optimizing con-























where the notation is the same as above.


























where again the notation is as before. Again, we assume that government
debt is indexed. For an comparison of cases where government debt are
indexed and non-indexed in a model with Blanchard-type consumers, see
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2004).
In this version of the model we assume the same behavior on the part of
￿rms as in Version I.
9.1.3 Estimation Models
By log-linearizing the model around steady state we are then able to derive
the New Keynesian ￿ IS-curve￿and ￿ Phillips curve￿(for proofs, see Muscatelli
et al., 2003a,b, Leith and Malley, 2002, Gal￿ et al., 2001).
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+ b yt+1 ￿ G
Y ￿b gt+1
(17)


















































The Phillips Curve is given by:
b ￿t =
￿b ￿t￿1 + ￿￿Etb ￿t+1
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
[￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))][1 + (￿=(1 ￿ ￿))￿]
b st (18)
where b st is the percentage change from steady state of the labour cost















b t￿ ￿ b n
￿
+b nt￿b yt
The IS curve and Phillips curve constitute our structural model, which
is then simulated jointly with the policy rules, the government budget con-
straint, and with the assumptions made about nominal wage adjustment.
9.2 A Two-country New Keynesian Model
We now extend the model to account for open economy features, assuming
that two countries (Domestic, d, and Foreign, f ) form a monetary union.
Total consumption is still de￿ned as in (11), but only a proportion n￿ of them
is produced in the Home economy. Domestic consumers can now hold their
wealth in domestic (Bd) or foreign (Bf) bonds, denominated in the same

































t (z) de￿nes the foreign currency price of good (z) and e is the
￿xed nominal exchange rate, normalized at 133. Home consumer￿ s demand

























As in Leith and Wren Lewis (2004) we assume that PPP holds for the























































































































































































































t￿1 + ￿￿Etb ￿
d
t+1
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)










t￿1 + ￿￿Etb ￿
f
t+1
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
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￿
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(29)
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